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ANTHONY SCOTT*

The Canadian-American Problem
of Acid Rain"
INTRODUCTION

This article addresses the problem of Canadian-American acid rain,
urging certain steps that soon must be taken. Many experts are vouschafing
the seriousness of acid precipitation damage,' and public spokesmen are
fully concerned with the enormous costs of abatement.? But too few of
these specialists are considering the daunting questions of independence
and intrusion involved in any agreed program of abatement. Presumably
the majority must feel that, after seventy-five years' experience of U.S.Canadian cooperation on projects and coordination of policies, there is
no need to plow through the initial legalistic and diplomatic steps that
have impeded progress between European countries. In support of this
optimistic position, the existence and success of fisheries agreements,
convention agencies, and of the International Joint Commission (UC)
under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 are often cited.' It is argued
that if the bilateral fisheries' commission can handle fishery management
disputes, and the UC can recommend how to deal with the pollution of
the Great Lakes, there should be a similar type of institution created to
deal with acid rain.'
This optimism is understandable. But the two nations may not be able
to benefit from past experience and, instead, find themselves forced to
work out some solution from first principles. A first point, indeed, is that
the equitable principles involved in Canadian-American environmental
'Professor of Economics. University of British Columbia.
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the William Lyon Mackenzie King chair at the University Consortium for Research on North America..
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diplomacy are by no means settled. Both countries give lip service to
two potentially contradictory principles and have yet to decide which of
them should apply to acid rain. One of these is the principle of absolute
territorial sovereignty by the upstream or emitting party. The opposite
principle is that of external responsibility.5 These principles are
discussed
in the second section of this article. In addition, the two countries should
ponder the choice between principles seriously enough that they would
be able to base a future program of compensation payments on whatever
principle they conclude is relevant.
The "principle of access,"6 discussed in the article's third section,
might be used to reduce the need for continuous top-level bargaining.
This principle calls for each country to admit citizens of the other country
to its courts, hearings, tribunals, and political meetings concerned with
pollution questions. But because it depends on individual initiative and
private response, this principle can be disappointing. Individual argument
and pleading under foreign rules cannot get far with acid rain. Perhaps
its chief value is that, like the conflict between the two main principles
of international equity, it focuses attention on compensation.
Fourth, once a principle has been selected, the two countries can use
the UC to help develop and apply it to the acid rain situation. But not
before.
It would destroy the LJC to ask it to provide or declare the equitable
principles
on its own. And fifth, the system of marketable international
pollution certificates is a better way to choose a principle, organize data
collection, make payments, and attain allocative efficiency.7
Conceivably this stress on choice of principle is excessively legalistic.
It is certainly paradoxical that the author, as an economist, is urging the
importance of coming to a sufficient agreement, almost immediately, on
sovereignty, property, and equity, while some legal experts are urging the
two nations should avoid such legalisms and get on with the coordinated
economic management of the North American environment. Starting with
a recognition of the continent-wide, if not global, scope of acid rain and
realizing that atmospheric circulations do not respect national borders,
they argue that a cost-effective pollution reduction system should be based
strictly on economic and technical criteria. Following their agenda for
internationally coordinated environmental management, the United States
and Canada would plan and select the necessary measures by a cosmopolitan version of "benefit-cost" analysis. No project would be selected
5. See generally Scott, Fisheries. Pollution and Canadian-American Transnational Relations. in
TRAN GOVERNMTA. RELATIONS 234-55
(A.B. Fox, A.O. Hero & J.S. Nye eds. 1976).
6. Id.
7. See d'Arge & Kneese, State Liabllit for international .Environmental Degradation: An Economic Perspective. 20 NAT. REs. 1. 427 (1980).
CANADA AND THE UNn'ED STATES: TRANSNATIONAL AND

Spring 1986]

THE CANDIAN-AMERICAN

PROBLEM OF-ACID

339

IN

for the total program unless the value of its contribution to damage
abatement was greater than its addition to the total program's costs. The
nationality of those who benefitted from or paid for the projects, and the
geographical location of the abatement projects and of the reduction in
environmental damage would be irrelevant for project selection. At each
stage the only rule would be that program benefits to whomsoever they
accrue should be greater than costs wherever they fall.
The way for this approach was paved by the early utilitarians whose
slogan may be adapted by saying that it would bring something like the
greatest good for the most inclusive group of people.' Although it has
been attempted on very few international occasions, it has been approximated in the international management of one or two common or jointlyoccupied resources: the west coast sockeye salmon, the dam projects on
the Columbia and St. Lawrence rivers, and in the evaluation of the tidal
power in the Bay of Fundy.9
This coordinated management approach seems objective and free from
narrow nationalism. If it were followed in dealing with acid rain, the two
nations would escape from the legalism of competing principles of sovereignty or liability. But they have never yet been willing to ignore the
border. Indeed, some are especially indignant about acid rain just because
it is dumped on them by foreigners. Because this feeling exists, it is
apparent that rigorous coordinated management is not a fruitful way to
start planning. If it is attempted, there will be legalistic and nationalistic
delays later on. The best evidence for this belief is found in the history
of Canadian-American international undertakings. Only when the two
countries had achieved prior agreement about the rights and responsibilities of each of them was it possible to proceed with such regimes of
joint management as that under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.0
Before examining two contending equitable principles, the "solidarity"
principle should be touched on." Under it. neighboring states should
cooperate by keeping each other informed about activities involving their
environment that might also have transfrontier effects. One can combine
items in the drafts of the U.N. Law of the Sea convention, the U.N.
Stockholm Declaration, the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)
8. R.C. d'Arge & A.V. Kneese. Some Legal. Ethical. Economic. and Political Aspects of Transfrontier Pollution (1982) (paper prepared for conference on the Transboundary Effects of Acid Rain.
April 1. 1982. Las Vegas. Nevada).
9. Scott. International Environmental and Fisheries Pacts. in THEORY AND STRUCTURES OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (. Sandier ed. 1980): J. KRLrMLLA. THE COLUMBIA RIvR
TRETY (1967).
10. A.D.P. HEENEY. ALONG THE COMMON FRONTIER: THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION
(1967): P.E. CORBETT. THE SETTLEMENT OF CANADIAN-AMERICAN DISpUTEs (1937).
I1. Scott. Transfronier Pollution:Are New InstitutionsNecessary?. in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT.

ECONOMICS OF TRANSFRONTIER

POLLUrON 177

(1976).
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statement. the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) recommendations, and other sources to get a "'solidarity"
list:
Countries must keep each other informed: must confer with each
other: must cooperate to prevent and cope with emergency pollution
episodes: must not discriminate against each other: must verify and
monitor: and (to paraphrase the ECE). must develop without undue
delay policies and strategies that will augment existing national measures to combat air pollutants.' Although these policies have occupied much space in international
proposals they need not be of concern here, for Canada and the United
States have already achieved this kind of solidarity in environmental
matters. What further questions of principle must be settled before setting
up a program on acid rain?
THE CHOICE BETWEEN PRINCIPLES
The first candidate for the principle underlying an acid rain agreement
is territoriality: that the primary right in international law is that of a
sovereign state to utilize resources. land, and the environment within its
territorial limits without interference from other states. In conflicts concerning the environment, and water and fishery resources, this right can
mean that the upstream state has full rights to emit wastes into its environment, to change the levels or flows of rivers, and to fish. to an
extent unaffected by these action's consequences downstream. This Was
the interpretation of current international law held by Canada and the
United States before they signed the Boundary Waters Treaty in 1909. "
By that treaty. they in effect undertook not to behave according to this
principle with respect to boundary and transboundary waters at least, and
they set up the -UC to oversee an alternative regime. The rights they
believed they could have continued to claim in the absence of their treaty.
rights which here are referred to as constituting a "territorial" approach.
comprise the first contending principle available as the basis for an acid
rain agreement.
The second principle, that of external responsibility, is a denial of the
first. It is that an upstream state does not possess an unqualified right to
use its environment so as to cause harm within another state. It was
embodied in the decision of the tribunal in the famous Trail Smelter case
of 1941.4 It is important not just because the tribunal worded its decision
12. ORGANIZATION FORECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
IN FRoNTIER REGIONS (1979).
13. Id.
14. (U.S. v. Can.) 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1938 (1941): see generally Rubin. Pollution bvAnalogy:
The Trail Smelter Arbitration. 50 OR. L. REv. 254-82 (1971).
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as a statement of international law in the inter-war period (in one way
or another the case stretched over nearly twenty-five years), but also
because whether or not it represented international law at the time, the
tribunal did reflect the views of the two governments. Actually the decision was an ambiguous one, because the tribunal wrote that this principle
holds in law "when the case is of serious consequence."' 5 What did it
mean by this qualification?
One interpretation is that a policy of the first state that permits pollution
that does not seriously injure persons or property in the other country is
within the rights of that state. 6 This interpretation recalls the test of
"reasonableness" used in the common law. Injury would be "serious- if
those who caused it were emitting fumes to an "unreasonable" extent,
or if those who were harmed suffered injury beyond what they might
"reasonably" have expected. It also suggests that "serious" pollution

might be defined by a test of neighborliness. As between adjoining states
international law should not be called on over small things, states must
expect to suffer to some degree from their neighbor's actions and both
must learn to rub along together. This line can be extended to the conclusion that each state must follow a sort of Golden Rule: impose on

others only that pollution that you also impose on your own people or
territory. It can also be extended to a sort of continentalism: in making
the best use of the environment, states should not be tightly constrained
by international boundaries.
An alternative interpretation of the Trail Smelter holding. however,
leads in the opposite direction, although it seems equally consistent with
what the tribunal wrote. It is that the word "serious" was intended to
signify that downstream damage would have to be very profound or

extensive indeed before a case against anupstream state causing pollution

could obtain relief or remedy under the law of nations. 7 The tribunal
meant to reassert the first principle, that territoriality is what really matters. States possess full rights to permit activities within their own limits;
those rights outweigh the rights of the downstream country to be free
from such injury. In any case, the tribunal found that as a matter of fact
the injury arising from the fumes from the Trail Smelter was "serious"
and recommended the compensation that should be paid. " Thus. whatever
it meant by serious, the actual decision was the first in a line of declarations
of the second principle, that of external responsibility.
Canada and the United States have subsequently conducted their environmental relations sometimes according to the territorial principle,
sometimes according to the opposite. neighborliness principle. It is easy
15.
16.
17.
18.

3 R. Int'l Artb. Awards at 1965.
1d.
d'Arge & Kneese. supra note 7.
3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1938.
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to point to some well-known examples of approaches derived from only
one of the two principles. For instance, fisheries' disputes usually proceed
from the territorial approach. Before any steps can be taken in developing
combined operations for halibut, salmon, or the Georges Bank fishery,
both countries have first to invest a good deal of time achieving agreement
on rights to fishing on or sovereignty over the marine areas concerned.
Canada in particular has dedicated the careers of some of its most distinguished public servants to international issues concerned with the Law
of the Sea, and this legalistic, territorial approach has seemed acceptable
and natural to all Americans and most Canadians."
On the other hand, in dealing with pollution issues the two countries
have often tended to sidestep the territorial preliminaries. It has instead
seemed acceptable and natural to emphasize the ecological and environmental unity of the two countries. For example, even on questions where
the legal rights of the parties have not yet been sorted out, there are many
experts who recommend that the principle basis for policy be recognition
of the connections between the two economic systems, similarities between the policies and procedures of the two governments, and the integrity of their water systems, atmospheres, and natural ecologies.2" For
these experts the aim is not to achieve a national territory unviolated by
pollution from abroad, but to find policies whereby on both sides of the
border similar people are asked to obtain similar environmental quality
by making similar sacrifices in the form of controls, foregone employment
opportunities, or taxes.
Therefore, the Trail Smelter arbitration did not in 1941 end the era of
absolute territorial sovereignty. What it did achieve was a further development of "solidarity," or willingness of the two governments to negotiate
together on remedying environmental damage, a willingness already signalled b.y their cooperation on migratory birds and fisheries matters and
especially by the existence of the Boundary Waters Treaty and its instrument, the IC. But after the Trail Smelter question had receded into the
past, the two countries had not yet picked a single principle of international
environmental relations. Sometimes one or both had, and has today,
unashamed recourse to the principle of territorial sovereignty.2' On other
occasions, they tend not to ignore transfrontier pollution since it goes
beyond the worst that a country would tolerate for itself."2
CARROLL, supra note 3; W.R. W.Lnou-Lw
Y.THE JOINT ORGANmAONS OF CANADA AND THE
STATEs-" (1979).
HEENEY, supra note 10.
CARROLL, supra note 1.
See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION. POLLUTION OF THE LOWER GREAT LAm (1970) [here.
mar cited as ImENATIONAL JOINT CommissioN (1970)]; INTERNATIONAL JoINr COMMSSION, GREAT
LAKE DivmSIoNS AND CONSUMFVE USES (1985) [hereinafter cited as ITERNATIONAL JOINT COMMIS19.
UNi'
20.
21.
22.

SION

(1985)].
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Both the United States and Canada have, of course, participated with
other nations in attempting to redefine the law of nations to deal with
boundary waters, the high seas, and the atmosphere. The outcome of
such "internationalism" has often been in the direction of better-defined
territoriality. A good example is the historic dependence of the first Geneva

Convention on the Law of the Sea on the preceding United States' autonomous Truman Proclamation' gaining international recognition for its
jurisdiction over contiguous submarine resources. Territoriality also describes Canada's unilateral declarations concerning its rights over Arctic
waters 4 and its claims to territorial rights over Georges Bank.2 United
States' interests have not always been so clear to its government but it
too has, in the various forums where international law regarding transfrontier pollution, fishing rights, ocean-floor mining and so on have been
debated and resolved, struggled for either territoriality or freedom of the
seas. The first principle, in other words, is very much alive.
Compared to the two countries' association with these hard-fought,
acquisitive, and prescriptive international declarations, those other international meetings in which they have participated that have led to endorsement of the second principle have had much less international impact.
The famous nonofficial codification of the international law concerning
international rivers, known as the Helsinki rules.' follows the Trail Smelter
case in asserting that states do not have a right to pollute waters in their
own country to the extent that serious injury would result in a downstream
country. In 1971 the drafters of the U.N. Stockholm Declaration on the
Human Environment' obtained agreement to a similar proposition, that
upstream states should not permit the environment downstream to be
damaged by upstream activities under their control. Such declarations
were not new. Canada and the United States had already inserted a pious
declaration of this kind concerning international transfrontier pollution in
their 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, to the effect that they agreed that
neither boundary waters nor waters flowing across the boundary should
be polluted on one side to the injury of health and property on the other.2
23. Proclamation No. 2667. 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-48). reprinted in 59 Stat. 884 (1945).
24. See CAN. Rv. STAT. Ch. 2 (Ist Supp. 1970).
25. See Can. Gaz.. Extra MP. 101 (Nov. I. 1976).
26. See generally Bourne. The Development of InternationalWater Resources: The Drainage
Basin Approach. 47 CAN. BAR REv. 62-87 (1969): Bourne. Mediation, ConciliationandAdjudication
in the Settlement of International DrainageBasin Disputes. 9 CAN. Y.B. INT'L. L. 114-58 (1971):
Bourne, Procedure in the Development of InternationalDrainageBasins: The Duty to Consult and

Negotiate. 10 CAN. Y.B. INT'L. L. 212 (1972).
27. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 3. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
48/14/REV. 1 (1973) (Stockholm. June 5-16. 1972).
28. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION-RULES ON PROCEDURE

AND TEXT OF TREATY (1980).
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The international declarations on outer space and ocean dumping adopt
the same general approach.-9
Thus the second principle undoubtedly survives, and note has been
taken of it by a widening circle of states. But it has yet to displace the
first, nationalistic, accepted principle as the starting point of international
negotiations concerning such specific issues as the eutrophication of the
Great Lakes or the killing of soils and waters by acid rain.
EQUAL RIGHT OF ACCESS AND TRANSFRONTIER COMPENSATION
A new principle. "'equal right of access,'" has been urged as an approach
to transfrontier pollution.". It is in some degree merely a way of recommending to countries that they make explicit and formal an undertaking
to listen to, and to consider. claims that their actions and policies will
harm individual citizens of another country. It is introduced here because
it raises questions about liability and compensation that are carried over
from private international law.
Formally. the principle of right of equal access has been proposed so
that in each country there will be as much protection given by judicial
and administrative procedures to individual and regional interests downstream as that given to interests within the upstream nation's territory.
Such procedures not only permit or enjoin pollution but also govern
settlement by agreements calling for compensation and/or partial abatement."'
The OECD secretariat amplified the procedures inherent in the equal
2
access principle in 1977 in Legal Aspects of Transfrontier Pollution.
"Foreign persons" would have rights to participate equally with local
persons in hearings and enquiries concerning official decisions and. particularly, to have recourse to administrative and judicial appeal procedures
to abate, prevent, or be compensated for transfrontier pollution. The
principle is most fully embodied in the 1974 Nordic Treaty' in which
nationals of any Scandinavian country can, under some circumstances.
use their own or a foreign court or administrative procedures to protect
themselves from transfrontier pollution. '
But North. Americans need not look to Europe for informal examples
of equal access. While judicial access across the border is infrequent,
29. 1.WALTER. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS OF POLLUrON (1976). "
30. See generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEvELoPMENT. sUpra note 12.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Convention on the Protection of the Environment Between Denmark. Finland. Norway. and
Sweden. Feb. 19. 1974. 13 I.L.M. 591. 592 (1974).
34. ORGANIZATION FORECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. supra note 12.

Spring 19861

THE CANADIAN-AMERICAN

PROBLEM OF ACID RAIN

illustrations of more informal administrative and political proceedings
emerge almost every week in the torrent of dealings between the two
countries. At the most local level, groups and individuals confer with
and complain to councils and administrative bodies just across the border
about releases of flood water downstream; about smoke from forestry
slash burning crossing the border, about the condition of the Love Canal;
and about traffic on international bridges and ferries. 35 At the state and
provincial level, governments are familiar with "foreign" delegations
turning up from the other country to put in their oar on local decisions
or to appear before formal hearings considering provincial or state measures that will also have a foreign-country impact.36
Furthermore, the courts of many American states already have recognized rights of standing by persons from other states to participate in
review or appeal of local policies or actions; they can sometimes be
extended to admit foreigners. At the highest national level, there are more
and more examples.3" Most effectively and most informally. Canadian
emissaries lobby the Congress and the White House to gain support for
their environmental objectives. In addition the Canadian government participates in, or supports, Canadian groups pleading before U.S. tariff.
energy, communication. transportation, and environmental tribunals, often
with the aim of going directly for official approval for their position
perhaps of gaining official barring of some U.S. project. While it cannot
be said that U.S. citizens use Canadian procedures to the same extent,
they do use them in a limited way.3"
If everyone had access to the same courts or could settle suits arising
from acid rain damage privately, then there would be a mechanism that
would help to bring about the best possible adjustment to the pollution
problem. 3 ' Those who- wished to emit pollution but could not inexpensively reduce their waste discharges could pay compensation instead.
while those who did not wish to pay compensation could clean up their
emissions. Victims would gain either compensation payments or a cleanedup environment. The opportunity to compensate privately could make
everyone better off, upstream and downstream. Unfortunately, individual
opportunities to litigate or to settle privately are probably too costly to
be exploited. Drops of acid rain and other forms of reciprocal pollution
are not labelled so that the emitters and the victims can identify each
35. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION (1985). supra note 22.
36. N. SWAINSON. CONFLICT OVER THE COLUMBIA (1979).
37. CARROLL. supra note 1.
38. Id.: NEW ENGLAND GOVERNORS* CONFERENCE. INC.. BACKGROUND PAPERS ON ACID RAIN
(1984).
39. The following remarks have some relevance to Canada "adherine'"to the U.S. Clean Air

Act. § 115.42 U.S.C. §7415 (1982): see generally CARROLL. supra note I.
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other. Even if parties could access each others' courts and other administrative procedures, nothing helpful would emerge.
The importance of the possible adoption of a principle of private access
is that it creates a new dimension for comparison of the first two principles.
If private international law were based on the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty, then the chief roles of courts and tribunals would be
to adjudicate the amounts downstream parties ought to pay to set a "fair
price" for upstream state's abatement of pollution. For example, Holland
has paid France to reduce the dumping of phosphate wastes into the Rhine
to the injury of Dutch nurserymen. '
Alternatively, assume that under the second principle the law permitted
upstream industry to emit only a "reasonable" amount of waste into the
shared environment. Then the role of the courts and tribunals would be
to hear claims about by how much the emitter should cut down its pollution
or, instead, how much it should pay to those injured. A need to pay
compensation brings home the difference between the two principles. It
is natural for a country to favor that principle which serves it best. But
as between Canada and the United States, the border is so extensive that
neither can be sure when it will be "upstream" and when "downstream."
In 1909 when considering water diversion under the draft Boundary Waters
Treaty, each decided it would be, as often as not, the upstream country
and. so each decided to go along with the principle of upstream sovereignty." What would they decide today, on acid rain, if payments were
an alternative to pollution abatement?
Their calculations would almost certainly go beyond the rights and
liabilities of their individual citizens. There are pollution emitters and
pollution victims on both sides of the border. If polluters had the "rights,
the courts could order that compensation for abating be paid to polluters
on behalf of the present victims downstream in Ontario, Quebec, New
York State, and New England, millions of city and country dwellers whose
lakes, forests, and buildings have been damaged by acid rain. If. however,
victims had rights to no more than a "reasonable" injury, payments to
them would come not only from profits of those emitting fumes, but also
from the jobs and incomes of coal and oil workers, and from the prices
paid for final products by millions of consumers. Either way, if the payers
were to be helped by grants from their own governments, then millions
of taxpayers would also become involved. Indeed, in both countries, the
same persons might be involved as residents of upstream and downstream
regions, and as taxpayers as well.
One would expect that the governments would force the taxpayers to
40. Kiss. The Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution. 25 NAT. RES. J. 613. 632 (1985). see
generall~ d'Arge & Kneese. supra note 8.
41. HEENEY. supra note 10.
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assist the polluters to clean up. If not, the implication is that the governments will force either the polluter and the polluter's workers, suppliers, and customers, to pay compensation and clean-up costs, or the
victims individually to pay some clean-up costs. These would be drastic
solutions. Pollution is said to be intolerable, but pollution abatement
hardly increases anyone's cash capacity to cover the abatement costs. All
it will do is, at great real economic cost in labor and capital. restore our
lakes and forests to something like their condition twenty or thirty years
ago. So vast are the restoration costs that it seems obvious that either
polluters or victims can pay for them only very slowly or not at all. In
short, tax-financed assistance must and will be called for both in Canada
and the United States. If so, if the citizen taxpayer is to help cover the
costs of abatement and adjustment, one should also think of net payments
across the border, as might be called for between individuals under the
principle of access. This was agreed to in-advance in the Trail Smelter
case. " Of course, the direction in which the payment would flow is not
certain, for that depends on whether the principle of territoriality or that
of external responsibility is adopted.
Before embarking on an agreed program of acid rain cleanup. Canada
and the United States should agree in advance, at the highest level.
whether the burden of clean-up should be allocated on the principle of
absolute territorial sovereignty, or on the principle that each country may
not impose damage on its neighbours beyond some limit of reason or
seriousness. To give sharpness and point to this decision each should
contemplate that, depending on the costs of abatement, the amount of
damage, the direction of the flow of pollutants, and the prindiple that has'
been selected, it may be forced to make a net payment to the other country.
THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION AS LAWGIVER
Can the UC play a useful role in identifying or distilling principles
applicable to a joint program against acid rain? One way to examine this
question is to list the steps, or functions, necessary to almost any antipollution program and then to ask what the UC can do about each of
them.

The first step in most pollution proceedings has been taking notice of
damage. " This was certainly true of acid rain; both in Scandinavia and
in North America the issue was touched off by reports that fish had
42. See Trail Smelter Case. (U. S. v. Can. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905. 1965 (1938 & 1941):
Rubin. supra note 14.
43. Cumberland. Role of Uniform Standards in International Environmental Management. in
ORGANIZATION

FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION "AND DEVELOPMENT.

ECONOMICs (1972).
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disappeared from some lakes and rivers.' A scientific literature on acid
rain has now appeared. The second step is to link such damage to air or
water pollution. This is nowadays easy enough in a general way, but
more difficult to put into numbers. Some lakes and forests exposed to
pollution seem not to have been injured.4 Even the mere amount of
current changes in air pollution loadings is not easily ascertained. The
third step is to come to a conclusion about the source of such pollution.
In the old days of international concern about local sewage in the water
or smoke in the air, this third step was quite simple. One had only to
follow one's nose. But with water pollution by rare and toxic metals and
with air pollution by invisible gases, both of them transported far from
their emitting sources, this step is scientifically the hardest. 4
The fourth step is to decide on an international policy strategy or
program. For example, should the countries come to agreement on control
measures at the source, or should they simply agree to an ambient standard
(loading) in the general neighborhood of the presumed source? Should
they agree to reduce the flow of the pollutant (loading) across the border,
or to meet an ambient standard in the neighborhood of the place that is
damaged? Should they agree instead on control measures at the destination
or. finally, take steps to compensate those who live in the damaged region
as a substitute for reducing its exposure to polluted air or water?
The UC has served the two governments on all four steps. It has been
much more successful with the first three than with the fourth. Its international boards of experts, scientists. or technical advisers have provided
it with widely-accepted non-partisan information about damage. cause.
and source of pollution from coast to coast, and have alerted it to new
water and air pollutants, their effects, and probable causes. The UC has
considered this information and advised governments accordingly.
On the fourth step, strategy, the IJC has been greatly constrained.
When it has offered advice, it has been confined within explicit and
implicit terms of reference from the two parent countries. " ' The obvious
reason for this is that the good relations between the two countries cannot
be stretched to dilute each government's complete sovereignty over its
own territory. Nor may the UC suggest that either government avoid its
44. CARROLL. supra note I.
45. P.H. PFARSE. F. BERTRAND & ,l.W. MACLAREN. CuRRNTs OF CHANGE (1985).
46. The four steps mentioned in the text apply both to reciprocal and nonreciprocal pollution.
Obviously. however, the procedures would differ. See Scott. supra note 9: Scott. Economic Aspects
of Transnational Pollution, in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. PRO-

BLEMS IN TRANSFRONTIEt PoLLtiLoN (1974). For an alternative approach. see D. Munton. Politics.
Externalities and Environmental Dependence (1982) (paper prepared for Conference on the Politics
and Economics of International Stability and Cooperation. University of Minnesota. October. 1982).
47. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION (1985). supra note 22.
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complete responsibility to its own citizens. Hence, the commission cannot
-reach" far into national territory to recommend, for example, action
against specific sources such as municipalities, or firms on either side of
the boundary. The formal identification of such sources, the prescribing
of a policy against them, and subsequent monitoring and enforcement
are seen as national, not international, matters. There is no point in the
IC recommending that either government, or the UC itself, participate
in policies that would affect the liberties or actions of persons or places
in either government's territory. It is not a supernational agency. Consequently, it has been confined to recommending "objectives," physical
measures of the concentration of pollutants.
In short, the strength of the UC has been in describing and monitoring.
It developed its reporting strength in its earlier days when, performing
other duties concerning levels and flows of boundary waters, it gained
great prestige as an international regulatory agency, something like a
public utilities commission. It also established an unusual capacity to get
information processed by experts who were glad to work for it. In those
days too, with that regulatory function. it even developed some little
strength as an enforcement agency. It appointed binational control boards
to report whether individual applicants for water-use rights had conformed
to the rules and conditions it had set for them. Experience with these
control boards later enabled the UC to give some help with verifications,
and even with enforcement, of the two countries' final agreements on the
pollution of various river systems along the common frontier.4
However, in doing these things the goodwill and the prestige of the
IC has been stretched very thin. The two countries have used a waterlevels agency for purposes that were unheard of in 1909. They have
required its boards to make reports on questions that tore its experts'
loyalty in two directions.' 9 They have asked it to front for them in disputes
with their states and provinces.' They have even required it to criticize
one of its parent governments."
To expect it to continue on this overly ambitious course will be to
weaken its acceptability for its other unfinished tasks. Certainly it can
play some helpful role in whatever is to be done about acid rain. But the
role must be limited to whatever it can accomplish acceptably to all parties:
governments, states, provinces, pressure groups, and local- elected representatives.
48. HENY. supra note 10: see INTERNATIONA. JOINT COMMISSION. OBJWEcnvE FOR THE CONNECTING
CHANNELS (1950).
49. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION (1970) and (1985). supra note 22.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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To be more specific, the IJC should not be exposed to the conflict and
pressure that emerge when commissioners are asked to favor one country's
active policies, and the political partisans of that policy, against the other
country. It can publicize new ideas and new approaches, and pioneer new
standards. But there are functions it cannot perform. For example. it
cannot in planning go against the policies of either of its parent governments as some of its members believed was required of it during the grim
years preceding the Columbia River power agreement. Nor should it have
to base recommendations on future administrative, monitoring, and scientific organization on suggestions from experts whose own careers will
be dependent on what is recommended. It follows that it cannot begin to
recommend the necessary steps to reduce damage from acid rain until its
parent governments have established robust equitable principles concerning their rights and responsibilities.
It may be objected that one cannot expect governments to bind themselves in advance to acceptance of the workings of some general principle
when they do not know to what expenses or political problems its application may lead them. The answer to this objection is that in international affairs governments do sometimes so bind themselves. Canada
and the United States did so, for example, when they abandoned their
rights to unlimited fishing for sockeye salmon in territorial waters and
substituted a right to not more than 50 percent of each year's salmon
run.s2They did so when they accepted in advance some rules of thumb
about how power benefits and construction costs were to be shared under
the Columbia and the St. Lawrence rivers power projects." In fact,
countries do so all the time, whenever they sign a treaty that commits
them to some friendly behaviour over a future period.
If Canada and the United States are not willing to limit themselves to
acting within prior principles, this then urgently suggests they should not
depend on the IJC to plan an acid rain program for them. It is a useful
organization for their environmental diplomacy and planning now,' but
it would be wrecked if asked to put forward, without prior guidance on
principles, an abatement campaign that might be criticized by one or both
of the governments or assailed by citizen groups.
Without the UIC the two countries must proceed diplomatically, somewhat as they did before each of the great environmental/fisheries/boundary
waters treaties between them. They have already taken the first few steps.
52. CoRwrrr. supra note 10: see generally Scott. Fisheries. Pollution and Canadian-American
TransnarionalRelations. 28 INDusr"RuA. ORGANizATiON (1974).
53. J.KRLTVr.L supra note 9: N. SwAsoN. supra note 36.
54. See. e.g.. INTERNATiONAL Jowr COMMISSON. REPORT ON THE POLLUTION OF BOUNDARY WATERs (1951). N. SwAnNsON, supra note 36.
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A joint acid rain study group reported in 1979.11 Following it, a memorandum of intent was signed in 1980, accepting some of the findings of
the study group, and undertaking to appoint five bilateral working groups
to chart the next steps to be taken.ss
The memorandum called for functions to be performed reminiscent of
the four steps already listed, three of them routinely performed by the
IJC. Each function was to be assigned to a separate working group: (1)
effects (injury) from pollution; (2) pollution concentrations (loadings) and
chemical transportations from transported gases to acid precipitation; (3)
linking loadings to sources (synthesis); (4) control measures and their
costs at the source. The last group, (5) was to concentrate on institutions
and legal issues, including liability and compensation. Obviously it was
intended to work particularly closely with a supreme diplomatic coordinating committee. This structure would develop coordinated programs,
and facilitate an early Canadian-American bilateral agreement concerning
them.
By 1984 little of this had happened; President Reagan's administration
has given the acid rain problem as a whole, and the Canadian aspect of
it in particular, a low priority on its political agenda. 7 But the memorandum's assignments to the various working groups made sense, and
one can hope that when acid rain is returned to the list of active negotiations between the two countries, something like the above study structure will be used.
That the path of such a secretariat will run into serious nationalistic
and ideological roadblocks is evident from the fact that the groups were
asked to design alternative strategies,or scenarios, to consider their costs
and, at another stage, to consider the associated legal liability and compensation." How are these programs.. benefits, costs, and liabilities to
be reconciled? Probably the hope of those who drew up this committee
structure was that the experts, knowing the benefits and costs underlying
the alternative strategies, would somehow themselves allot rights and
sacrifices to citizens on both sides of the border, distilling some principle
as they worked.
This hope is born of desperation; it can only lead to strife and frustration. Each expert, after all, will be a loyal servant of one of the two
55. A.P. ALsHuLLER & G.A. McBEAN. FmsT REPORT OF TIM UNrED STATES-CANADA RESEARCH
CONSULTATION GRouP ON THE LONG-RANGE TRANSPORT OF AIR POLLUTANTS (1979).
56. See POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF A CANADA-UNITED STATES AIR QuALrrY ACCORD (S.
Eros & D. Munton eds. 1981); THE NEw ENGLAND GOVERNORS CONFERENC INC.. supra note 38.
57. See Canadian Embassy, Public Affairs Division. Canada Responds to United States Inaction
on Acid Rain (1984) (press release).
58. See Environment Canada. Memorandum of Intent Between the Government of Canada and
the Government of the United States of America Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution (1980).
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governments. He or she will not have a neutral, masterful. IUC to whom
to report. The experts will not have prior principles to guide them in
selecting projects or decisions concerning who must control or be controlled, pay or be paid. Because in this way the experts would be attempting to determine legal liability and technical strategy at the same
time, one can foresee a long, wearisome schedule of meetings, reports,
and rejections, along the lines with which the recent Law of the Sea
conference has made us familiar. 9 It is important to note that the course
of action under the Memorandum of Intent has not prevented political
action on both sides of the border. Canada has been very active with the
"'30 percent Club"' in firming up a 1971 convention on long-range
transport of air pollutants to deal with sulphur and, in 1984, nitrous
wastes. Much of this activity has involved agreement with Ontario and
the other provinces.' On the U.S. side, many bills have been submitted
to the Congress. most centering on the notion that U.S. emissions should
be reduced by 10 percent, or about 25 million tons, from the 1980 levels.6
For example, the Rinaldo Bill would reduce SO by 10 million tons and
NO, by 4 million tons. This would be accomplished by cost sharing with
funds to be generated by a tax of 1/2 mills/kwh plus a special bond issue.
Would it not be better to work, politically, on principle first? Once this
has been done, experts become comparatively bipartisan since they no
longer have to defend their countries' interests. Indeed, with principles
settled, the IC itself could easily handle much or all of the planning and
monitoring of an acid rain program.
NEGOTIATION ON POLLUTION CERTIFICATES AS A
SOURCE OF PRINCIPLES
The concept of negotiation on pollution certificates raises the possibility
of a new international institdtion that could meet some of the problems
of Canada-U.S. agreement on principle while at the same time using and
preserving the strengths of the UC. First explored in a joint survey with
Christopher Bo Bramsen, 6 ' it has since been revived several times." The
brief exposition below closely follows the original OECD formulation.
In any negotiation concerning transfrontier pollution, the states must
deal with a standard list of elements: the source, flow, loading and damage
from pollution; and a standard list of abatement measures, including their
59. M. Z.CHER. CANADIAN FOREIGN PoucYAND THE LAw OF THE SEA (1977).
ENGLAND GovERNoRs" CONFERENCE. supra note 38.
61. See ENVIRONMENT CANADA. ACID RAIN: THE CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE (1984).

60. See NEw

62. See. e.g.. Acid Rain Control Act of 1985. H.R. 2918. 99th Cong.. IstSess. (1985) (the
Rinaldo bill. to amend the Clean Air Act).
63. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. PROBLEMS IN TRANSFRONTI.R
POLLUTION (1974).
64. See. e.g.. Scott. supra note 9.
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costs, construction times, operation, subsequent alteration, and cost sharing. The beauty of the certificates scheme is in its information requirements. Its implementation would automatically lead the two parties or
their appointed agency to allocate research resources to the right questions. Furthermore, the setting-up and initial distribution of the certificates
does not so much require previously agreed general principles as provide
a constrained context for their distillation for the international pollution
problem. Finally, the scheme also offers efficiency results sought by
welfare economists. It is compatible with the emergence of a competitive
market for marketable pollution certificates that can be predicted to lead
to an efficient or lowest-cost means of acid rain abatement while either
keeping the individual distribution of income and wealth unchanged, or
altering it to a pattern deliberately chosen by the two nations.
Here are the rough outlines of the scheme. The countries' negotiators,
with their experts and researchers, would meet to organize bilateral international machinery to issue "certificates" carrying on their face an
entitlement to emit a unit amount of pollutant per year. These would be
distributed to polluters or governments within each country to permit, in
the initial year, whatever the current amount each is emitting. One task
for the negotiators would be to decide which emitters and regions were
in the international pollution airshed and so in the scheme. Probably the
decision would be reached to set up zones, with emitters in the regions
contributing least to transfrontier loadings receiving appropriately smaller
certificate entitlements. In this way each nation would be charged with
responsibility for ensuring that all discharges were discovered, for issuing
each discharger certificates proportional to its contribution to transfrontier
loadings, and for preventing the entry of new uncertificated emissions.
Although certificates 'would be issued for specific initial amounts of
pollution that may be discharged by each establishment, the amount
permitted by a certificate would decline according to a formula to be
negotiated. The formula would typically represent a path of maximum
discharge from the amount in the initial year to a target amount in a later
year. For example, a decline of 6 percent per year for fifteen years, or a
decline of four tons per year until zero is reached. The decline rates would
be the principal means of cleaning up pollution. They would force a
certificate holder either to abate his discharges or to buy extra certificates
from another holder, who would be forced to turn to discharge-free processes. The latter feature is described below. Settling on the rates of
decline would be a second principal function of the negotiators.
Certificates would be issued to dischargers of. and for, each type of
pollutant. Certificates could be bought and sold at any time, but must be
available for sale once a year. Consequently. certificates for different
types of pollution and different locations of discharges could be exchanged
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at market prices. This feature would be expected to lead to the highestcost abatement processes being installed last, as the decline process continued. Enforcement of pollution reduction would be simplified by the
certificate requirement, in that certificate holders would carefully watch
one another, looking for evasion.
Victims of pollution damage would be served in two ways: first. in the
negotiated stated rate of decline of permitted discharge, and second. in
an additional right to enter the market and buy pollution certificates, thus
accelerating the decline in the total amount of pollution permitted. Such
revisions in the schedule would cost the victim state whatever the going
price in the polluting state.
Another means of empowering intervention by the downstream state
might be to allow it to issue or sell new pollution rights. In this way it
could sell the right to postpone abatement, if polluters were willing to
pay enough. This sale of new certificates can be considered as a means
of compensation. On the other hand, the purchases of certificates by
downstream victim states would provide money to polluters. and would
thus be a means of cost-sharing. Describing and constraining the rights
of the downstream government and its citizens to participate in the upstream market for certificates would be a third major task for the initial
negotiators.
This scheme paraphrased above was essentially a proposal to assign
rights for disposal of wastes in a lake or stream. How would one expect
an air pollution scheme to perform? Information is scarce' for there are
very few in operation. Indeed most studies of pollution rights have been
made to support proposed, rather than actual, schemes. Until recently
the most thorough were those of R.G. Noll and his associates at the
California Institute of Technology' in connection with proposals to progress beyond the transferable rights, -or "bubble," aspects of the present
U.S. Clean Air Act.' Martin David and associates' 7 have considered
transferable water pollution permits." A very recent study by Scott E.
Atkinson deals with the Ohio Valley.' Important earlier work exists,
65. Hahn & Noll. Designing a Market for Tradeable Emissions Permits. in REaoRM oF ENvi.
RONMENrAL REGULATION 119 (W.A. Magat ed. 1982); Hahn. Market Powers and Transferable
Property' Rights. 49 Q.J. ECON. 4 (1984).
66. 42 U.S.C. §7401 et. seq. (Supp. 1 1977).
67. O'Neil. David. Moore & Joeres. Transferable Discharge Permits and Economic Efficiency:
The Fox River. 10 J. ENv'r'L. ECON. & MGM. 4 (1983).
68. Id.
69. Atkinson. Marketable Pollution Permits and Acid Rain Externalities. 16 CAN. 1. EcoN. 4
(1983): Tietenberg. Transferable Discharge Permits and the Control of Stationary Source Air Pol.
lution:A Survev and Synthesis. 56 LK ECON. 391-416 (1980): Seskin. Anderson. Jr.. & Reid. An
Empirical Analysis of Economic Strategiesfor Controlling Air Pollution. 10 J. ENv*T_. ECON. &
MO.r. 2 (1983); Krupnick. Oates & Van De Verg. On Marketable Air Pollution Permits: The Case
for a System of Pollution Offsets. 10 J. ENVT'L. EcoN. & MGmr. 3 (1983): and McGartjand & Oates.
Marketable Permitsfor the Prevention of Environmental Deterioration. 12 J. ENVT'L. ECON. & MGm'r.
3(1985).
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however, especially work on disposal in connection with river and lake
pollution.7 °
For economists these air and water pollution rights schemes have a
family resemblance to proposals to introduce individual rights to fish,
divert water, pump groundwater, extract oil, graze animals on land. and
occupy urban air space. A few of these do exist; all of them have tended
to deepen a useful literature.
From this literature one can put together a composite list of problems
and disadvantages of property rights in environmental resources. As might
be expected, the majority of them are problems mainly for economists.
They reflect the impossibility of ensuring, without excessive transactions
costs, that a new type of certificate once created will be held and transferred freely. Instead, writers predict that the government will limit right
transferability and, worse, fail to convey certainty that the number of
rights issued will not be increased under political pressure. 7' Also. they
fear that whatever market emerges will be uncompetitive, or will tend to
assist the concentration of rights' holdings into fewer hands than in an
open-access world. They point out that the rights scheme must be closely
monitored to assure that holders do not exceed their entitlements. And
they emphasize that marketable rights. like pollution charges and fish
royalties, cannot easily be denominated to deal with territorial or spatial
problems such as arise when a distant holder of a right proposes to sell
his entitlement to a buyer located much closer to the place where damage
or loss can be caused by his behaviour.
Most of these problems of allocation of activity over space. cost minimization, equal opportunity, and so on, are to a greater or lesser extent
problems for any other scheme. For domestic problems. rights schemes
appear off balance superior to charges and to pure regulation; however.
more space cannot be devoted to them here. Instead. admitting that the
scheme can be easily criticized for its imperfections. a return to aspects
of its suitability as an instrument for international action follows.
Therefore, the advantages of a rights scheme are cited here. First. it
directs preliminary researchers to seek for the correct information. For
example, the geographical scope of the pollution problem is also an urgent
problem for a certificate scheme. Until it is determined, a polluter who
buys a certificate from a firm that had not itself been a source of international acid rain miaht now add to the international problem. The sheer
mechanics of setting up the scheme require that researchers establish
those zones within which certificates can be freely transferred, and those
70. E.g.. W. BAUMOL & W. OATES. THE THEORY OF F-NVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1975 1: J.H. DALES.
POLLUTION. PROPERTY AND PRICES ( 1968): Montgomery. Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution
Control Programs. 5 J.ECON. THEORY 3 (1972): Rose-Ackerman. Market Modelsfir Water Pollution
Control: Their Strengths and Weaknesses. 25 PUB. POL'Y (1977).
71.
ee generally J. FAY & ). GOLOMs. CONTROLLING ACID RAIN: POLICY ISSUES (1983).
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between which they can be transferred only at an emission "discount."
As observed regarding international environmental negotiation in the
past. this is a tremendous advantage. The present acid rain "research"
efforts. within and outside the international memorandum of intention,
are part of an unbounded. endless, research domain. Almost any inquiry
in meteorology, engineering. chemistry. biology, geology, hydrology, economics. and political science can be justified as "relevant." Consideration
and adoption of the certificate scheme, however, would at once indicate
those avenues of research that are indispensable, and those which can be
postponed or neglected. The breadth of research connected with each of
the three steps becomes clear: which damage is to be considered in issuing
certificates, is it caused by pollution, and what are the sources of the
pollution for which certificates must be held? The negative aspects of
these questions are just as important: which emission sources are not
sources of international pollution and should not receive certificates, which
pollution situations cannot be linked to damage, and which damage is
not "serious?" While the breadth of these remaining questions cannot be
minimized, the scheme has a real advantage over others in almost automatically indicating research priorities.
A second advantage of a certificate scheme is that, from the beginning.
it narrows the generality of irritating questions of principle by directing
negotiations to the operations of an international certificate scheme. The
scheme has in its simplest forms an implication that the polluter must
pay. However, its gradual decline in each certificate's entitlement would.
as with the second principle, imply that the upstream party has not unlimited territorial rights. But the extent of this implication is itself subject
to bargaining. The rate of decline can be fine-tuned by zone, for example.
Many other modifications to the simplest scheme will occur to those
around the bargaining table. The point is that the scheme gives the two
countries an understandable structure which their experts and diplomats
can extend and refine.
Their refinements are not constrained to make the actual instruments
of emission control administered in the various states and provinces uniform or even that, at the plant or firm level, it be a "rights" scheme at
all. Each nation will receive a given number of certificates. These it will
probably distribute to regional agencies to allot to the original holders.
Each state or province can administer the agreed decline, as between its
individual emitters, as it chooses. The scheme only requires that all
certificates be available for sale once a year, by emitters or by the local
agencies regulating them. Thus the scheme can provide a framework for
a desired international result while leaving room for domestic policy
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variation, and leaving domestic administrative agencies responsible for
the incidence of local pollution abatement.
A third advantage is that the scheme can permit each country to bring
about an increased application of the first principle. With or without
negotiated restriction, the downstream country can help finance its own
release from acid rain by purchasing separate certificates in the upstream
certificate market. The more it buys, the more rapidly the sources of
pollution are induced to reduce their emissions by compensated abatement. Thus some international sale, rental, or transferability of certificates
would allow the downstream country to recognize the territorial rights of
the upstream country to make its own decisions, to be sovereign. Yet it
would allow the downstream country to flexibly participate in hastening
its relief from acid rain. For negotiations to discuss this procedure would
probably be easier and less precedent-setting than discussing principles
in the abstract.
Thus the design of this acid rain scheme requires a decision on both
the rate of decline of each certificate's permitted emissions, and on the
extent to which each country may, or must, participate in the purchase
of rights valid in the other country. In this way it permits prior agreement.
on the combined principles of how much territoriality and how much
responsibility to neighbors in a context in which the principles are not
textbook ethical principles but have predictable consequences. Agreement
between the two nations implies that the sharing of environmental benefits
and of abatement costs, and also the amount of "compensation" in the
form of across-border certificate purchases, are all understood.
The scheme would use the UC without straining it or destroying its
usefulness for other international problems. For example, one important
role for the UC would. be to verify that states, provinces, or individual
certificate holders were policed by their governments so as not to exceed
their emission rights. Another function would be to utilize its experience
and existing organization to see to the orderly reduction of the stock of
certificates outstanding every year. In addition, it would also have a
responsibility to set up an expert watchdog body to make sure that an
active certificate market existed. Failure in this respect would not be fatal
to the simplest variant of the scheme. But it would harm the cost-reducing
features of any transferable certificate system, and make it unattractive
for the downstream victims to make compensatory purchases of certificates in the upstream market.
While performing such function, the UC would be able to allow the
two governments to get the best of both worlds. They would obtain for
their acid rain scheme the advantages, unknown elsewhere, of an existing

358

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

(Vol. 26

organization prepared to act independently and firmly on matters of fact
and matters of performance. At the same time they would, by their
negotiation of a treaty during which equitable principles are dealt with
implicitly rather than explicitly and abstractly, preserve the UC for future
problems beyond acid rain.

